2007. An Institutional Theory Of Sanctions Onse... May 2026

: Nondemocratic leaders have smaller coalitions and can use the rents (extra resources) created by economic restrictions to buy off their core supporters, often making them more secure rather than less. Onset and Initiation

The 2007 article "," published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution by David Lektzian and Mark Souva , argues that the effectiveness and initiation of economic sanctions depend heavily on the political institutions of the target state. Core Argument: The "Winning Coalition" 2007. An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onse...

: For sanctions to work, they must create enough political pressure on the leader's "winning coalition"—the essential group of supporters needed to stay in power. : Nondemocratic leaders have smaller coalitions and can

Beyond success rates, the paper explores why certain states are targeted in the first place: Beyond success rates, the paper explores why certain

Autocratic leaders benefit from the scarcity created by sanctions to reward loyalists.

The authors utilize the Selectorate Theory to explain why sanctions often fail against autocracies but are more effective against democracies:

More likely against democratic targets; less likely against autocracies.